Reading for Life by Nussbaum, Martha C
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 1




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation




Wayne C. Booth. The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 534. $29.95.
Martha C. Nussbaum
Beaten by his stepfather, cut off from the love and care of his mother,
David Copperfield turns for companionship to a company of friends
whom the gloomy Murdstones have not had the forethought to suppress:
My father had left a small collection of books in a little room up-
stairs, to which I had access (for it adjoined my own) and which
nobody else in our house ever troubled. From that blessed little
room, Roderick Random, Peregrine Pickle, Humphrey. Clinker,
Tom Jones, the Vicar of Wakefield, Don Quixote, Gil Blas, and
Robinson Crusoe, came out, a glorious host, to keep me company.
They kept alive my fancy, and my hope of something beyond that
place and time-they, and the Arabian Nights, and the Tales of the
Genii,-and did me no harm. . . . This was my only and my con-
stant comfort. When I think of it, the picture always rises in my
mind, of a summer evening, the boys at play in the churchyard, and
I sitting on my bed, reading as if for life. . . The reader now un-
derstands, as well as I do, what I was when I came to that point of
my youthful history to which I am now coming again.
In this wonderful passage (which is even more wonderful read in full),
David, the mature author of his own life story, reminds his readers of the
power of the art of fiction to create a relationship between book and
reader and to make the reader, for the duration of that relationship, into a
certain sort of friend. Novels are David's closest associates; he remains
with them for hours in an intense, intimate, and loving relationship. As he
imagines, dreams, and desires in their company, he becomes a certain sort
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of person. In fact, the narrator clearly wishes us to see that the influence
of David's early reading has been profound in making him the character
we come to know, with his fresh childlike wonder before the world of
particulars, his generous, mobile, and susceptible heart. And the novel as
a whole, in its many self-referential reflections, calls readers to ask them-
selves, as well, what is happening to them as they read: to notice, for
example, that they are sometimes too full of love for certain morally defec-
tive characters to be capable of rigorous judgment; that they are perceiving
the social world around them with a new freshness of sympathy; in short,
that they are taking on increasingly, in the very shape of their desire and
wonder, the view of David's father-that "a loving heart is better and
stronger than wisdom."
People care for the books they read; and they are changed by what they
care for-both during the time of reading and in countless later ways
more difficult to discern. But if this is so, and if the reader is a reflective
person who wishes to ask (on behalf of herself and/or her community)
what might be good ways to live, then it becomes not only reasonable, but
also urgent to ask: What is the character of these literary friendships in
which I and others find ourselves? What are they doing to me? To
others? To my society? In whose company are we choosing to spend our
time?
These questions are obvious enough. We ask them all the time, in
many contexts: when we draw up reading lists for our students, when we
recommend novels to our friends, when we guide our children's reading.
But recent literary theory, on the whole, has either avoided or actively
scorned these issues. This resistance has several distinct sources. One is
the belief that ethical criticism of literature is bound to be dogmatic and
simplistic, measuring the literary work by a rigid normative yardstick
which ignores the complexities of the literary form. And, in fact, the sus-
picion has some justification; a great deal of ethical criticism has been like
this. Another source of resistance is the well-entrenched philosophical idea
that aesthetic interest is fundamentally distinct from practical interest, an
idea according to which ethical assessment of an aesthetic work would be
a crude error, betraying the assessor as failing to understand the nature of
the practice of aesthetic assessment. A closely related source of resistance
is the fashionable recent dogma that literary texts refer only to other texts
and not to the world-an idea implying, once again, that it is a naive
error to ask how literature speaks to and about us. The old formalism and
the new defense of "textuality" are distinct in terminology, but they have
many links of motivation and argument. Still a further obstacle to ethical
evaluation is the view, also fashionable, that all ethical evaluation is irre-
trievably subjective. This is sometimes expressed, in the literary world, by
saying that all reason-giving is a kind of power-seeking, all argument the
expression of "ideology." And finally, we must mention disaffection and
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loss of love. Professional writers about literature too often end up losing
contact with the love of books, with the fresh delight that led David Cop-
perfield to his friendship with the "glorious host." But once that delight is
lost, little remains for evaluation, and it is easy to see why the whole idea
loses its allure.
In this fine, rich book, Wayne Booth takes on all of these opponents,
including the last, and makes out a compelling case for the coherence and
importance of ethical criticism. He does this with a vigor and-openness of
engagement that remind us of our own experiences of literary absorption
and delight. (Booth does not discuss David Copperfield or the passage I
have quoted, but his entire book could be seen as a commentary on it.)
According to Booth's guiding metaphor, a relationship with a literary
work (and he explicitly includes his own book here), is a kind of friend-
ship; and a good friendship, he says, is something voluntary. It is, then, a
little difficult to know how, in light of this metaphor, we might think
about that strange kind of enforced intimacy, the relationship of reviewer
to book reviewed. So I wish to begin this review by saying that this book
is one that I shall willingly read again and reread-for the range and
detail of its arguments, for the vigor of its concrete readings of texts, for
the importance of its questions, for its humor and clarity and generous
humanity. It is to be recommended warmly to anyone with a concern for
the role played by the humanities, and by the interpretation of texts, in
our public culture.
I. RELOCATING ETHICAL CRITICISM
Booth tells us that he began his career as a defender, like so many
others, of "happy abstract formalism" (p. 5), believing that political and
ethical questions, asked of a literary work, were "blatantly non-literary"
(p. 5). One day, he and other like-minded humanities teachers at the Uni-
versity of Chicago were discussing the freshman reading list, which had
for years included Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Paul Moses, a young black
assistant professor, "committed what in that context seemed an outrage:
an overt, serious, uncompromising act of ethical criticism" (p. 3). Moses
told the other instructors that the book made him angry and he could not
teach it again. Its assumptions about the proper relations of liberated
slaves towards whites and its distorted portrayals of blacks seemed to him
"just bad education." The other instructors (all white) were both embar-
rassed and offended. This was no way to talk about a great work of art.
"I can remember lamenting the shoddy education that had left poor Paul
Moses unable to recognize a great classic when he met one" (p. 3). Poor
Moses was too angry, clearly, to take up the proper aesthetic attitude.
The Company We Keep, dedicated to the memory of Paul Moses (who
died at the age of thirty-seven, only four years after this event) is the
19881
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record of Booth's gradual realization that this response to Moses will not
do; that Moses was exactly right to ask these questions about literature,
right to regard our relations with literary works as important elements in
the building of character, right, therefore, to feel that critical ethical dis-
course about these relationships is not only legitimate, but actually essen-
tial to a just and rational society. "To me," Booth concludes, "the most
important of all critical tasks is to participate in-and thus to reinforce-a
critical culture, a vigorous conversation" (p. 136). This book, then, pro-
vides not only a theory of ethical criticism, but many concrete examples,
as Booth describes his gradual evolution from the smug and condescending
formalist of the Moses anecdote to the passionate defender of the con-
tinuity between art and life seen here; and therefore, also, from a some-
what uncritical admirer of "great art" to a person who asks and ponders
many difficult questions about the ways in which great literature has por-
trayed women, minorities, and, in general, our political and social
relations.
There have been many forms of ethical criticism of literature, some of
them extremely crude and unappealing. Booth therefore spends a good
deal of time in Part I of this book (entitled "Relocating Ethical Criti-
cism") distinguishing his own proposal from its relatives. The account is
complex, but four distinctions emerge as especially important. First, "ethi-
cal," as Booth. uses it, is a very broad and inclusive term. It covers every-
thing that pertains to asking and answering the question, "How should
one live?" Enjoyment, distraction, even contemplation of form, are all as-
pects of the ethical as Booth understands it-so long as they are seen as
forming part of a human life, and are assessed accordingly. The question
he asks of a literary work is nothing so narrow as, "What does it show me
about my moral duty?" It is, rather, "What relationship does my engage-
ment with it have to my general aim to live well?"-and to live, we
should add, as a member of a society, since Booth insists that human be-
ings are social and political beings.
Second, Booth does not practice ethical criticism by judging particular
sentences, or even particular characters, removed from their context in the
work as a whole. Practiced in this way, ethical criticism is clearly vulnera-
ble to the charge of neglecting the work's literary structure. Booth's gen-
eral question is, instead, "What sense of life is expressed in this work as a
whole?"-in its design, the shape of its sentences, the interrelationships of
its parts. To practice ethical criticism in this way, the critic must be sensi-
tive to literary form. And Booth gives us a great deal of help here, intro-
ducing a complex framework of useful analytic conceptions that he has
also defended in other writings. In particular, he urges readers, as they
ask questions about a literary work, to distinguish three voices that are too
frequently run together: the narrator (the character who tells the story);
the implied author (the sense of life or the outlook that reveals itself in
[Vol. 1: 165
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol1/iss1/10
Nussbaum
the structure of the text taken as a whole); and the writer (the real-life
person, with all her or his lapses of attention, trivial daily pursuits, and so
forth). Although Booth has interesting things to say about the reader's
relationship to all of these figures, ethical criticism is concerned, above all,
with the relationship between the reader and the implied author. Good
ethical criticism, then, does not preclude formal analysis, but actually re-
quires it. Style itself shapes the mind; and these are the effects that a good
ethical critic discerns.
Third, ethical criticism, as Booth intends it, does not have a single dog-
matic theory of what literature should be or do: for example, that it
should reinforce a certain definite moral code, or should put the reader in
contact with "otherness." Avoiding what he calls "loaded labels and crude
slogans" (p. 7), Booth sensibly insists that there are many good things for
literature to do and be-just as many as there are good things in human
lives. And he insists on the Aristotelian point that what is good also may
be, to some extent, a function of the reader's own particular needs, back-
ground, and context. On the other hand, there are also some things
against which ethical criticism can perfectly reasonably take its stand. We
can stand against sadism, racism, sexism; and, also, apart from morality
more narrowly construed, we can stand against what Henry James once
called "the rule of the cheap and easy"-against, then, sloppiness, vulgar-
ity, and the trivialization of important things.
Fourth, Booth's main concern is not with the consequences of reading
after the fact. He does consider this an important topic; but the interac-
tions of reading with other elements of life are so complex that relatively
little, he thinks, can be said about consequences in a general way. He
therefore focuses on a more tractable question: what becomes of readers as
they read? How do works of various kinds shape their desires and imagi-
nations, fostering, during the time spent reading, a life that is either rich
or impoverished, complexly attentive or neglectful, shaped or shapeless,
loving or cold-and so forth?
In all these ways Booth's ethical criticism avoids pitfalls that have
plagued much of the ethical criticism of the past, and made it easy to
dismiss. His subtle analyses of what sentences of certain sorts do to desire
and thought convince the reader, again and again, that ethical criticism
need not be preachy or formally insensitive. The balance of Part I is spent
in a discussion of the logic and argumentative structure of evaluative criti-
cism, and in arguing against skeptical opponents who hold that all evalua-
tion is hopelessly subjective. The two arguments go together, since Booth
contends that the skeptic's fall into skepticism can be traced to overly sim-
ple assumptions about the form of rational evaluative argument. Identify-
ing all rational argument with deductive argument that proceeds from
premises that are necessarily true, the critic finds that no such argument
seems to be available in literary evaluation (or, one might add, in ethics
19881
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more generally). Seeing this, the skeptic concludes that all argument is
expression of feeling, or an attempt to gain power; there is no distinction
between persuasion and manipulation. Booth responds by describing, de-
fending, and repeatedly exemplifying a form of non-deductive, yet genu-
inely rational, argument that he calls "coduction": a cooperative argument
not so much ad hominem as inter homines, in which principle, concrete
experience, and advice from one's friends interact over time to produce
and revise judgments. Since this account of practical reasoning is one of
the book's most interesting contributions, especially for legal scholars, I
shall return to it at greater length.
Part II develops Booth's central metaphor: a literary work is like a
friend, and we can assess our literary relationships in much the same way
that we assess our friendships, realizing that we are judged by the com-
pany we keep. He derives his account of friendship from Aristotle, hold-
ing that it is a relationship based on trust and affection, in which we
pursue our ends in a social way, sharing, to a large extent, the friend's
activities, desires, and values. Evidently, then, the friends we choose are of
great significance for the quality of our lives. Aristotle held that there are
three different bases or grounds for friendship: pleasure, usefulness, and
good character. Booth argues that all three elements, in different combina-
tions, inform our choices of reading. And he argues that it would be diffi-
cult to explain why we would choose to spend hours in such intimacy
with the mind of an (implied) author unless one or more of these three
were the basis. Like Aristotle, he holds that a friendship based upon char-
acter and aspiration is the best and richest, though all three types have
their place in a good life. This ranking, he argues, is a good starting point
for the evaluation of literary experiences, seen as component parts of a
life. Especially bad will be experiences in which we are in the company of
an implied author with a bad character, forming desires and projects that
are sadistic, brutal, unjust, or merely wanton and sloppy. But relation-
ships that offer, let us say, only some useful information or some momen-
tary relief are less valuable than those that enrich our lives in some more
substantial way.
Booth next proposes a set of more concrete questions that we may ask
of a text as we begin our evaluation of its character and of the relationship
it offers us. He tries out these questions on several texts, asking in each
case how our desire and thought are shaped as we read. Peter Benchley's
Jaws is a negative case in point. Booth deftly shows how narrow the range
of our sentiments and conceptions becomes as we read it, what a "loss of
life is involved in deciding to spend several hours that way."
The story tries to mold me into its limited shape, giving me practice,
as it were, in wanting and fearing certain minimal qualities and ig-
noring all others. I am to become, if I enter that world, that kind of
[Vol. 1: 165
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desirer, with precisely the kinds of strengths and weaknesses that the
author has built into his structure (p. 204).
Other modern examples-from Norman Mailer, Anne Tyler, W. B.
Yeats, James Joyce, e.e. cummings-give rise to a variety of more com-
plex analyses. Booth ends the chapter by praising the contributions of an
open-ended list of works (by, among others, Shakespeare, Jane Austen,
Cervantes, Dickens, Tolstoy) on the grounds that these works enable
readers "to live during these moments a richer and fuller life than they
could manage on their own" (p. 223). Part II concludes with an analysis
of the ways in which literary metaphor, in particular, shapes the thought
of the reader.
Part III is devoted to extended critical analyses of four writers who
have recently been the targets of ethical criticism because of their political
or social views. This is an especially fascinating part of the book, since we
see plainly Booth's love of good writing, and the reluctance with which he
is persuaded, in some cases, to the negative ethical conclusion. Booth is no
rigid ideologue. He comes across as a rather cautious man, but one who
cares about social justice and is committed to rational argument. His ex-
amples of his own changes of mind thus have much conviction as exam-
ples of practical reason in a democratic culture. All four analyses show
him changing his judgment over time, as new advice, rereading, and expe-
rience combine with general moral principle to generate fresh evaluations.
A long, complex analysis of feminist criticisms of Rabelais ends with
victory for the feminists. Booth, however hard he tries on behalf of an
author he likes, cannot, once he goes into the matter thoroughly, avoid
being convinced that the text as a whole has an offensive view of women.
His esteem for Rabelais is consequently diminished.
An analysis of related criticisms of the ending of Jane Austen's Emma
comes to a far more complex conclusion. Austen, Booth argues, is clearly
not the dupe of a naive myth that women find happiness through the
protection of beneficent father figures. She gives evidence throughout her
novels of a far more skeptical and critical view of romance, and of
women's possibilities. And yet, in the case of Emma, the structure of the
ending does seduce us into loving the very outcome she elsewhere criti-
cizes. Booth concludes that the form of the romantic novel imposes its own
norms of desire and longing, even in an author as critical and independent
as Austen. Undertaking to write in that form, she encounters, so to speak,
a tension between its expectations and her own.
An impressive chapter on D. H. Lawrence narrates and justifies
Booth's movement from disdain for Lawrence to enthusiasm. In this case,
where the conclusion is somewhat less popular in liberal circles than
Booth's other judgments, I think the reader is particularly likely to feel
the force of the process of coduction at work, as she sees how an argument
19881
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of the detailed and patient type Booth envisages (and makes) can actually
lead to the revision of a once firmly-held judgment.
Booth ends the book where it began: with the history of his own
changes of view concerning Huckleberry Finn, presented now as detailed
readings and re-readings of the text. Booth has not only come to agree
with Moses about ethical assessment in general, he has also come round to
Moses' view of the novel, noticing paternalism and condescension where
he once saw only the touching portrayal of black nobility. Here we have
an especially clear case of the way in which some ongoing moral princi-
ples (especially a respect for human equality) guide interpretation, in the
light of new experiences and consultations with others. The revised judg-
ment is convincing as one that embodies a more complete human under-
standing. The reader is likely to be persuaded that it is a rational judg-
ment, and not merely a product of a shift in fashion or the expression of
an ideology-in part because Booth carefully gives evidence for his posi-
tion, but also because one senses that the .story of change could not be told
in the other direction. Once certain things have been noticed in a text, and
connected, as here, to reflective perceptions of actual human societies, one
cannot go back, choosing the ignorance that allowed an untroubled enjoy-
ment of the novel.
This is, evidently, a large and a rich book, about which much will be
written. None of its central themes can be given full critical examination
in a review, even one of this length. But there are three topics on which I
would like to say more, and to raise some questions: the boundaries of the
literary, the metaphor of friendship, and the analysis of practical reason-
ing in terms of "coduction" and "pluralism."
II. PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
Booth's subtitle is An Ethics of Fiction, and many of his examples, in-
cluding all the ones in Part III, are novels. But his analysis is actually far
more wide-ranging. It includes examples from lyric poetry and also from
works of philosophy. (Burke is a central example in one section, Kant in
another; the section on metaphor discusses many accounts of the cosmos,
both religious and philosophical.) There is, of course, absolutely no reason
why Booth's analysis cannot be extended in this way. And yet one regrets
that Booth focuses so little on the distinctive qualities of our relationships
with literary works-never asking at length, for example, how the friend-
ship one can have with a novel differs from the friendship promised by a
philosophical treatise; how it differs, as well, from the relationship one is
able to form with a lyric poem. The absence of sustained analysis along
these lines does not undercut anything that he does say. But since Booth
has such an enthusiasm for the works he loves, and for novels above all,
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one feels a disappointment that he says so little about what kind of "peo-
ple," as friends, novels are.
One does not want facile generalizing here, clearly. One has to begin
with particular cases and work outwards. And yet, if we think of David
Copperfield's "reading for life," we become aware that a claim is being
made, in Dickens, on behalf of novels more generally: a claim that they
offer a distinctive patterning of desire and thought, in virtue of the ways
in which they ask readers to care about particulars, and to feel for those
particulars a distinctive combination of sympathy and excitement. The
gloomy religion of the Murdstones would have none of Peregrine
Pickle-and for good reasons, from its own viewpoint.
Dickens is well aware that novels like his cultivate desire and imagina-
tion in a way that is morally suspect-not only for the Murdstones but for
ethical and philosophical positions of many different kinds, some of them
very respectable. Think, for example, of Mr. Gradgrind's school in Hard
Times, where "fancy" is forbidden. The consistent utilitarian, in Dickens'
view, must have a deep mistrust of the literary imagination, since it binds
the mind to particulars that lie close to the self, discouraging that impar-
tial concern with all humanity that is the core of utilitarian rationality.
(Concerning his daughter, Louisa, Mr. Gradgrind reflects, with satisfac-
tion, "Would have been self-willed, but for her bringing up.")
Novels, then, as a form of writing, have a distinctive, and a controver-
sial ethical content. Even David Copperfield cannot claim that they have
made him more consistent and more steady in his judgment. For he
clearly connects his early love of stories with his love for his cohort in
story-telling, James Steerforth-a character dashing, erotic, and
amoral-and with his later unwillingness to judge Steerforth from the
moral point of view. He also makes it. clear to his readers that Agnes
Wickfield, emblem of religious morality, is no novel-reader herself. Dick-
ens's case for the novel, in the light of such challenges, is inseparable from
David's claim that the fresh imagination of particularity is an essential
moral faculty, and that the tender susceptible heart is morally finer than a
firm one.
Such claims, and many others related to them, deserve full scrutiny
within the enterprise of ethical criticism. I hope that Booth will at some
point write on this subject, saying more about the complex connections
between what one wishes to say and the selection of a genre or structure
in which to say it.
III. FRIENDSHIP, SEDUCTION, AND A SCHOOL FOR THE MORAL
SENTIMENTS
This brings me directly to my second set of questions, about the meta-
phor of friendship as Booth develops it. It is a marvelously rich and illu-
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minating metaphor, but some of its aspects remain, so far, incompletely
explored. First, there is an unresolved tension, in Booth's text, between
two ways of characterizing these friendships. The main line of Booth's
argument speaks of the literary relation as a friendship, and refers to Ar-
istotle for elucidation. But in Aristotle, though friends share one another's
ends and are deeply influenced by one another, each retains independence
and critical autonomy. Booth, however, describes the reader's relation to a
literary work in a different way, invoking the language of seduction. He
talks frequently of "succumbing," of "that primary act of assent that oc-
curs when we surrender to a story" (pp. 32, 140). This language is im-
portant to his argument and cannot be easily removed. For the fact that
we surrender trustingly to the forms of desire in the text, allowing it, so to
speak, to have its way with us, is crucial to Booth's case for saying that
ethical assessment is urgently required. If he allowed the reader more crit-
ical distance, he could also, perhaps, allow the reader more vicious and
harmful books.
Here, I believe, we see an area in which distinctions among literary
genres, and, in particular, a distinction between literature and philosophy,
would have been especially fruitful. Philosophical texts, on the whole, do
not seduce. Indeed, they repudiate that aim. They ask the reader to be
wary and skeptical, examining each move and premise. Mistrust rather
than trust is the professional norm, since Socrates, if not earlier.
Texts built along these lines embody a distinctive view of how one
ought to treat another human being and conduct a relationship, a view in
which erotic love plays little part. Novels, by contrast, are, on the whole,
erotic. They invite the reader to assent, to succumb, to be made, for a
time, in the image of the text. Reading novels, as David Copperfield well
knew, is practice for falling in love.
There is much more to be said here. For most of the great ethical nov-
elists have approached the novel's seductive power as both a resource and
a problem. Jane Austen, as Booth describes, skirmishes against the genre's
erotic structures with her skeptical good sense, both inviting the reader's
trust and warning that all may not be as it seems. Dickens, in our exam-
ple, wrestles with the problem of combining Agnes's moral judgment with
Steerforth's romantic onward movement; and both the "good angel" and
the "bad angel" dictate the shape of the text. About Henry James, Tol-
stoy, Proust-there would be, on this score, fascinating inquiries to be
made.
In making such inquiries we might arrive at a new account of the role
of ethical criticism. Booth's book does not seduce its readers; it sets out,
clearly, to avoid that. It speaks far more like the philosopher than like the
novelist, inviting readers to inspect the argument, and to clarify their own
relation to it by comparing it with their own experience. This level of
reflection and self-examination seems essential to complete the critical cul-
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tures Booth describes. The novels by themselves would never have brought
him to change his mind about them. It is only by both succumbing and
also asking ourselves why we succumbed, and whether we should have,
that we respond to literature in the most fully human and social way. So
by making a firmer distinction between the philosophical and the literary,
and between judgment and seduction, Booth could show more clearly
what the contribution of his own project can be expected to be.
To discuss this contribution well will be a complex task. For philoso-
phy, too, has its seductive power, its power to lure the reader away from
the richly textured world of particulars to the lofty heights of abstraction.
It, too, can promise escape-from the messy and difficult world we live in
to a world made more simple and schematic. This sort of seduction can
frequently be pernicious in human life. On the other hand, the seductions
of literature can frequently return us to a richer and more complex world;
and the very enchantments of the novel can lead the reader past her ten-
dencies to deny complexity, to evade the messiness of feeling. Nonetheless,
when all this is said, there still seems to be a need for a certain sort of
critical philosophy, even to show us the importance and the rightness of
literature. But in order to be the ally of literature, philosophy will need to
be, itself, less abstract and schematic, more humble in its claims for itself,
than philosophy has frequently been. It will have to choose for itself a
style that reveals, and does not negate, the insights of literature. To de-
scribe such a philosophy and its relationship both to literature and to
other sorts of philosophy seems to me to be a very important task. I hope
that Booth will undertake it.1
We now need to discuss one further point about literary friendships. It
is an obvious point, so obvious that Booth does not explore it: When one
reads a novel one is alone. No other live person is there responding.
Therefore there can be no interchange of the sort we associate with love
and friendship. This point does not undercut Booth's metaphor as he uses
it-but it prompts several ethical reflections that do not come up until one
states the obvious.
First, one has to say that books are not sufficient for good human liv-
ing. They promote absorption and, beyond a point, hinder mutuality. One
needs real people too, however correct Booth may be when he says that
relations with books are sometimes richer than those with people. On the
other hand, the lack of realness in a book also has a salutary side, which
is brought out very well, in different ways, by both Henry James and
Proust: towards novels it is not possible to feel certain bad emotions of the
real personal life, such as jealousy and the desire for revenge. It is, on the
other hand, perfectly possible to feel sympathy and love. So in this way
1. 1 have discussed this issue more fully in "Love's Knowledge," in Perspectives on Self-Decep-
tion, ed. B. McLaughlin and A. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 487-514.
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novels can be a school for the moral sentiments, distancing us from blind-
ing personal passions and cultivating those that are more conducive to
community. Proust goes so far as to say that the relation we have with a
literary work is the only human relation characterized by genuine altru-
ism, and also the only one in which, not caught up in the "vertiginous
kaleidoscope" of jealousy, the reader can truly know the mind of another
person. I would not go that far, but there is a real issue here, and I do not
think we can fully understand the ethical contribution of the novel with-
out pursuing it.
There is one last point of a different sort that needs to be borne in mind
here. I can treat a book as I would never think it right to treat a real live
person. Sometimes people feel the need for complete numbing distraction,
distraction so complete that it simply blots out all stress and worry. Con-
sider, now, two people in search of such undemanding release. The one
hires a prostitute and indulges in an evening of casual sex. The other buys
a Dick Francis novel and lies on the couch all evening reading. There
must be, I think, a huge moral difference between these people, a differ-
ence that Booth's insistence on the friendship metaphor fails to bring out.
(I say this as someone who reads in just this way whenever I finish writ-
ing a paper, and I am attempting to defend myself from Booth's harsh
assessment.) The person who hires a prostitute is seeking relief by using
another human being; he or she engages in a transaction that exploits and
debases both a person and an intimate activity. The person who reads
Dick Francis is not, I believe, doing any harm to anyone. Surely she is not
exploiting the writer; indeed, she is treating Francis exactly as he would
wish, in a not undignified business transaction. Is she exploiting the im-
plied author by hiring him for her pleasure? I find this a peculiar ques-
tion; and I think the answer must be, she is doing nothing morally wrong
in relieving her stress this way. I think this contrast needs to figure some-
how in Booth's account, and it might moderate slightly his harshness to-
wards the uses of popular fiction.
IV. PRACTICAL REASON AND PLURALISM
This brings me to the aspect of the book that will be of most interest to
legal scholars: Booth's defense of the objectivity of practical reason in the
interpretation and evaluation of texts. Booth explicitly appeals to legal
reasoning as a model for his own view (pp. 72-73); and the Aristotelian
view of judgment he develops, both in his explicit theoretical account (pp.
70-77) and in his practice, is indeed one that has interesting links with
views of legal judgment. Yet there are some obscurities in Booth's position
that may limit its usefulness in this sphere.
Booth calls the evaluative judgments he recommends "coductions." (The
"co" indicates both that such judgments are made socially, in conversation
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with others, and that they have an implicitly comparative element.) In
coduction, unlike deductive demonstration, we do not begin from premises
that are known, prior, and held absolutely firm throughout. We begin,
instead, from our own complex history as beings with principles, with
historical memory, with "untraceably complex experiences of other stories
and persons" (p. 71). The initial evaluation of a new literary experience
is always implicitly comparative: the text is evaluated against that com-
plex background.
This initial impression can then be transformed in several ways, as I
compare my impressions with those of others. It can become more con-
scious and explicit; it can become grounded in the experience of others as
well as in my own; and it can be held up against background principles
and norms. "Every appraisal of a narrative is implicitly a comparison be-
tween the always complex experience we have had in its presence and
what we have known before" (p. 71). At this point, Booth cites Samuel
Johnson on the contrast between deduction and such experience-based
judgments:"
Demonstration [of the sort possible in scientific matters] immediately
displays its power, and has nothing to hope or fear from the flux of
years; but works tentative and experimental [that is, works that de-
pend on experience] must be estimated by their proportion to the
general and collective ability of man, as it is discovered in a long
succession of endeavors. (Explanatory supplements supplied by
Booth.)
It is a major aim of the book to show that such judgments are not just
expressions of subjective whim or political ideology; they can be rational.
The model of practical reason is indeed a promising one, though I think
more could have been done to give it a detailed philosophical grounding. It
has a great deal in common with Aristotle's account of practical wisdom,
and also, more recently, with some impressive work on practical reasoning
by Charles Taylor.8 Since Booth is not a philosopher, he might have done
well to supplement his own discussion with some extended description of
related philosophical discussions.
But the account remains attractive; and Booth does convince the reader
that skeptics about evaluation are skeptics because they are looking for the
wrong sort of argument-failing to find it, they are led to give up on
reason altogether. (This is a point on which Taylor has written elo-
2. Samuel Johnson, Preface to The Plays of William Shakespeare (1765), vol. 7 of The Yale
Edition of The Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven, 1968), 60.
3. Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason,"
presented to a conference on The Quality of Life at the World Institute for Development Economic
Research, Helsinki, and forthcoming in a volume from the conference, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen.
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quently.4 ) We begin to have real trouble, however, when we try to connect
the account of coduction with Booth's frequent claims that his view of
ethical criticism is "pluralistic." Here I think the absence of explicit phi-
losophy does real damage. For Booth's references to his "pluralism" seem
to specify several distinct views, not all consistent with one another, and
some of them at odds with the claims he makes for coduction. We need to
sort these views out and to ask which one (or ones) his argument actually
requires.
We find at least'the following positions in the text:
1. Pluralism as multiplicity of component goods. Frequently Booth
uses the word "pluralism" in connection with the view that there are
many distinct and non-homogeneous valuable things, and, therefore, many
good roles for literature to play in life. This position is fully compatible,
clearly, with his claims for the non-subjectivity of evaluation; and it is an
important claim, on which much of his argument relies.
la. Pluralism as multiplicity with conflict. Sometimes this multiplicity
of goods generates a tragic tension-as when Booth's love for the warmth
and humor of Twain's novel conflicts with his aversion to its paternalism.
Here we do get some true statements of the form "X is both good and
bad"-but without logical problem, since the good and bad features of the
object are distinct, though contingently impossible to separate. Again,
there is no threat to objectivity here.
2. Pluralism as Contextualism. Sometimes when referring to pluralism,
Booth makes statements of the form, "X is both good and bad," in connec-
tion with what we might call an Aristotelian contextualism: what is good
for you in your circumstances is not necessarily good for me in mine. As
Aristotle said, the diet that is good for Milo the wrestler would be ruinous
for you and me; or, as Booth observes, it would be good for a moral sub-
jectivist to read and reflect about The Old Curiosity Shop, though the
same experience might not be so good for someone excessively inclined to
dogmatism (p. 68). Again, such claims are an important part of Booth's
argument. And again they are not in tension with his claims for the non-
subjectivity of evaluation. Judgments must always be sensitive to concrete
circumstances; but, given this, there is no reason why we cannot say that
this, and not that, is ethically good.
3. Pluralism as Multiple Specification of the Good. This position notes
that important ethical principles frequently operate at a rather high level
of generality, and are susceptible of many concrete specifications, not all
of them simultaneously instantiable and each adequate for realizing that
principle in practice. Suppose, for example, that one decides that a good
human life should make room for friendship, and that what is essential in
good friendship is reciprocity and the effort to treat and benefit the other
4. See Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason."
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for the other's own sake (as in Aristotle's account). One may then notice
that a variety of relationships, concretely very different in kind (in differ-
ent social traditions, for example), all exhibit those morally valuable char-
acteristics. One cannot have all those forms of friendship together, and
perhaps not even in a single society. But they are all similar in their mor-
ally relevant characteristics. Pluralism here would consist in saying that
all of them are good, though they are in many ways non-compatible. This
position is harder to pin down in Booth's book, but I think it is present
often enough in many of his tolerant and democratic statements. Here,
again, pluralism does not in any way compromise ethical objectivity.
At some points in his argument, however, Booth has a tendency to as-
sert two stronger and more problematic positions. (This happens espe-
cially when he is trying to convince the reader that he is no dogmatist.)
4. Plural world-versions without contradiction. In the section of the
book dealing with cosmological myth, Booth seems to express a view that
bears a close relation to Nelson Goodman's pluralism of world-versions,'
though Booth does not link his view with Goodman's. This view claims
that there are many alternative versions of the world that have value and
validity. (It appears that these versions, as Booth describes them, are in-
commensurable, and thus not in contradiction with one another.) There
are standards of rightness by which we can narrow the group of accept-
able versions, but we cannot rationally opt for any of the acceptable ones
over any other. It is very hard to assess the relationship of this view to the
first three uses of pluralism and to the defense of coduction, since it is
philosophically underdeveloped in Booth's text and is never applied to
ethics. Such a view need not lead in the direction of ethical relativism or
subjectivism, if the many versions are all mutually consistent (or at least
not inconsistent), and are simply used for different purposes or in differ-
ent contexts. On the other hand, some of Booth's examples from religion
lead me to suspect that the claim is actually more relativistic than that,
and thus more problematic for coduction.
5. Plural versions with contradiction. Finally, there are several places
where Booth simply asserts, as an example of his open-minded pluralism,
contradictions that I see no way of resolving. Early in the book, he ap-
pears to say that he holds both Aristotle's view of friendship and the
Christian account (p. 173)-although in many essential respects the two
are in direct contradiction (over the worth of the person, the proper basis
for love, and so forth). This is a pluralism that leads to ethical confusion.
On page 348, Booth explicitly urges the reader to take in, and to believe,
a collection of cosmic myths that is "to some degree incoherent and self-
contradictory." On page 351, he appears to sympathize with skeptical at-
tacks on logic; and frequently in the last part of the book, he refers to his
5. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).
1988]
15
Nussbaum: Reading for Life
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
own ethical convictions (for example, his anti-racism) as "my ideology."
Wanting to accept and believe all candidates for truth, he reaches the
verge of giving up on reason-based ethical judgment.
This more sweeping and problematic pluralism does not seem to be an
easily eliminable feature in the book, since Booth makes such assertions
often, as if they had some importance. But it should be eliminated, since it
is a feature that undermines the book's central argument, and threatens to
give the field back to the very opponents-subjectivists and skeptics of
many sorts-whom Booth has so ably criticized in the book's earlier parts.
I think Booth is, at this point, bending over backwards to answer his real
or imagined critics in the literary world, hastening to reassure them that
he is no dogmatist, no stuffy defender of logic. He should not bend over so
far. First of all, it will not work. Many people will hate this book and
will call Booth a reactionary; that is the price he will pay for his defense
of reason. Second, it sells out his position. Anti-racism, by Booth's own
account, is not just his "ideology." It is an ethical position both defensible
and defended by rational argument.
Booth should, I think, retain pluralism as multiplicity, as contextual-
ism, and as multiple specification. He might combine this with some ver-
sion of Goodman's plural world-versions, if he could spell out the con-
straints carefully enough. But to tolerate contradiction within practical
reason cuts the heart out of the process of coduction, which moves forward
by noticing a tension between one claim and another. Booth should hold
his head high and ignore the people in the literary world who scoff at
non-subjectivism. His books will be around a long time after those fash-
ions have been forgotten.
Friends of books like this one, neither succumbing nor even assenting,
argue a lot. The vigor of the criticism this book provokes is a clear sign of
its value. Its strength and perceptiveness will enhance the public debate
about these urgent questions. That, as Aristotle would say, is civic friend-
ship, and this book is a civic friend.
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